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Abstract In 1968, the Harvard criteria equated irrevers-
ible coma and apnea (i.e., brain death) with human death
and later, the Uniform Determination of Death Act was
enacted permitting organ procurement from heart-beating
donors. Since then, clinical studies have deﬁned a spectrum
of states of impaired consciousness in human beings: coma,
akinetic mutism (locked-in syndrome), minimally con-
scious state, vegetative state and brain death. In this article,
we argue against the validity of the Harvard criteria for
equating brain death with human death. (1) Brain death
does not disrupt somatic integrative unity and coordinated
biological functioning of a living organism. (2) Neuro-
logical criteria of human death fail to determine the precise
moment of an organism’s death when death is established
by circulatory criterion in other states of impaired con-
sciousness for organ procurement with non-heart-beating
donation protocols. The criterion of circulatory arrest 75 s
to 5 min is too short for irreversible cessation of whole
brain functions and respiration controlled by the brain
stem. (3) Brain-based criteria for determining death with a
beating heart exclude relevant anthropologic, psychosocial,
cultural, and religious aspects of death and dying in soci-
ety. (4) Clinical guidelines for determining brain death are
not consistently validated by the presence of irreversible
brain stem ischemic injury or necrosis on autopsy; there-
fore, they do not completely exclude reversible loss of
integrated neurological functions in donors. The question-
able reliability and varying compliance with these guide-
lines among institutions amplify the risk of determining
reversible states of impaired consciousness as irreversible
brain death. (5) The scientiﬁc uncertainty of deﬁning and
determining states of impaired consciousness including
brain death have been neither disclosed to the general
public nor broadly debated by the medical community or
by legal and religious scholars. Heart-beating or non-heart-
beating organ procurement from patients with impaired
consciousness is de facto a concealed practice of physician-
assisted death, and therefore, violates both criminal law
and the central tenet of medicine not to do harm to patients.
Society must decide if physician-assisted death is permis-
sible and desirable to resolve the conﬂict about procuring
organs from patients with impaired consciousness within
the context of the perceived need to enhance the supply of
transplantable organs.
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Introduction
Human consciousness has two dimensions: arousal or
wakefulness (i.e., level of consciousness) and awareness
(i.e., content of consciousness) (Zeman 2001). Clinical
studies have deﬁned an overlapping spectrum of pathologic
states of impaired consciousness (Fig. 1): coma, akinetic
mutism (locked-in syndrome), minimally conscious state,
vegetative state and brain death (Wijdicks and Cranford
2005). Brain death is one of the states of impaired con-
sciousness which is characterized by irreversible coma and
apnea (Zamperetti et al. 2004). As early as 1968, Henry K.
Beecher, chair of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard
Medical School to Examine the Deﬁnition of Brain-Death,
believed that organ donation from those who were
‘‘hopelessly unconscious’’ would be beneﬁcial to society
(Giacomini 1997). In that same year, the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee introduced the deﬁnition and the guidelines for
determining ‘‘brain death.’’ These guidelines are now being
referred to as the Harvard criteria (Beecher and Ad Hoc
Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the
Deﬁnition of Brain-Death 1968). This set of criteria singled
out a speciﬁc state of impaired consciousness, redeﬁned it
as brain death, and equated this speciﬁc medical condition
with human death (Capron 2001). The equation of brain
death with death itself was deemed necessary to improve
the likelihood of societal acceptance and legalization of
heart-beating organ procurement (Giacomini 1997). Since
the concept of brain death was enacted into the Uniform
Determination of Death Act (UDDA) and brain death was
declared as equivalent to human death (National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 1981), this
act has been a driving force to permit organ procurement in
heart-beating donors.
The procurement of cadaveric organs has been a cor-
nerstone of balancing the supply of and demand for
transplantable organs for modern transplantation practice
and programs in the United States. The medical condition
of ‘‘brain death’’ affects a small number of patients in
intensive care units in the United States (President’s
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research 1981; Truog
2007). The rate of organ procurement from brain-dead
donors has decreased over time because of improved pre-
ventive measures, such as the legal mandate in most states
in the United States requiring bicyclists and motorcycle
Fig. 1 Overlapping states of impaired consciousness and coma in
human beings as sources of transplantable organs. The overlapping
spectrum of states of impaired consciousness including coma poses
serious diagnostic challenges to clinical practice guidelines attempt-
ing to declare irrecoverable conditions in human beings to expedite
the procurement of transplantable organs within hours to days of
acute brain injury. Errors in determining a potentially reversible coma
or a state of impaired consciousness as an unrecoverable condition of
brain death can have fatal consequences
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123riders over age 18 years to wear helmets, and improved
medical care and rehabilitation of the injured human brain.
In fact, the reduction of potential brain-dead patients suit-
able for organ procurement was one of the main reasons to
reintroduce non-heart-beating organ donation (NHBOD),
also known as donation after cardiac death (DeVita and
Snyder 1993). The Pittsburgh protocol, established in 1993,
lays the groundwork for the justiﬁcation and legalization of
recovery of transplantable organs from patients with other
neurological states of impaired consciousness (Fig. 1) who
cannot be declared brain-dead (Hoffenberg et al. 1997).
The Pittsburgh protocol deﬁnes the loss of arterial pulse
with circulatory arrest for 2 min as the circulatory criterion
for determining death in NHBOD. Since the redrafting of
the Revised Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) in
2006, more patients are likely to be determined to be
NHBOD than are those patients determined to be heart-
beating donors using the brain death criteria (Verheijde
et al. 2007b).
Brain-based criteria for the determination of death,
althoughwidelyaccepted,remainacontentiousissueamong
philosophers, legal scholars, physicians, and other medical
professionals. In this review, we reexamine the validity of
deﬁning death based exclusively on either neurological or
circulatory parameters for organ donation. We contend that
neurological or circulatory parameters currently utilized in
heart-beating or non-heart-beating procurement of trans-
plantable organs conceal a medical practice of physician-
assisted death. The term ‘‘physician-assisted death’’
includes intentional life-ending acts with consent such as
active euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide and other
intentional life-ending acts performed without explicit
request (Quill 2007). This prevailing practice is being per-
formed with no public disclosure ignoring the need for a
broad ethical, medical, and legal debate in society.
Brain death as a source of transplantable organs
Neurological criteria of death
Historically, the absence of comprehensive criteria for
death has led society to rely on a deﬁnition based on car-
diorespiratory criteria (i.e., the prolonged absence of arte-
rial pulse and respiration), which clearly delineate the line
between being alive and being dead.
Technologic advances in life-support systems have
made it possible to procure and transplant viable organs
from patients who are in irreversible coma and apnea but
have retained spontaneous functions of the heart and cir-
culation. In recognition of this reality, a broader deﬁnition
of death, i.e., brain death, was legislated in the UDDA
(President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems
in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research
1981). The UDDA explains that a person is determined to
be dead upon sustaining either irreversible cessation of
circulatory and respiratory functions or irreversible cessa-
tion of all brain function, including that of the brain stem
(President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems
in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research
1981). This determination must be made in accordance
with accepted medical standards.
Since human death is a single phenomenon, a deﬁnition
of death should incorporate contemporary knowledge and
an understanding of human biological processes (Fig. 2).
Prolonged arrest of blood ﬂow causes irreversible ischemia
(and necrosis) of the whole brain and cessation of all
integrated neurological functions. From a neurophysiologic
perspective, a minimum cerebral perfusion pressure of
15 mmHg is required to sustain blood ﬂow and oxygen
supply to the brain (Ivan and with contributions by Melrose
2007). Cerebral perfusion pressure is the gradient between
mean arterial and central venous pressures subtracted from
the intracranial pressure. The amount of brain necrosis that
occurs when the cerebral perfusion pressure falls below this
level determines the reversibility or ﬁnality of coma in
human beings. Absent arterial blood inﬂow to and venous
outﬂow from the brain on four-vessel cerebral angiography
demonstrate complete cessation of intracranial circulation.
Prolonged cessation of intracranial circulation eventually
results in necrosis and irreversible cessation of integrated
neurological functions in heart-beating brain-dead patients.
Although brain-dead patients have no intracranial cir-
culation and (by deﬁnition only) irreversible loss of spon-
taneous respiratory drive and consciousness, the heart and
whole body circulation continue to function spontaneously
in these patients, i.e. without the use of vasoactive medi-
cations for hemodynamic support. Spontaneous circulation
maintains many integrated biological functions in brain-
dead patients that are indistinguishable from living human
beings, and in some cases these patients can survive on
mechanical ventilation for years (Shewmon 1998). Some of
the biological functions include wound healing, body
temperature regulation, growth to puberty, reproduction,
successful completion of pregnancies and delivery of
healthy infants (Truog 2007). Therefore, the concept of
death based on only neurological criteria—i.e. irreversible
cessation of all brain functions or brain death—does not
fully encompass the notion of irreversible loss of integra-
tive unity of the organism and its regulatory functions that
are essential for life (Joffe 2007b; Karakatsanis and
Tsanakas 2002; Shewmon 2001; Zamperetti et al. 2004). In
its white paper entitled ‘‘Controversies in the determination
of death,’’ The President’s Council on Bioethics sets out to
rebut exactly that position and proposes a new approach to
answering the question of whether a diagnosis of ‘‘whole
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123brain death’’ means that the human being is dead (The
President’s Council on Bioethics 2008, p. 10). The Council
proposes to replace the term ‘‘brain death’’ with the term
‘‘total brain failure’’ for the clinical diagnosis that under-
lies the current neurological standard (p. 12). The Council
recognizes that the central question of whether total brain
failure equates with the death of the human being ‘‘cannot
be settled by appealing exclusively to clinical or patho-
physiological facts’’ (p. 49). In the absence of sufﬁcient
empirical evidence for the concept of brain death, to sal-
vage the concept of brain death and to continue support of
the current practice of procuring organs from heart-beating
donors, the Council proposes to ground this concept in a
completely new philosophical rationale. This rationale has
not yet been the subject of public debate. It acknowledges
that ‘‘A human being whose death has been determined
according to a neurological standard is the ideal source of
transplantable organs’’ (p. 8). It argues that living organ-
isms preserve themselves and, for that, ‘‘must—and can
and do—engage in commerce with the surrounding world’’
(p. 60). ‘‘If there are no signs of consciousness and if
spontaneous breathing is absent and if the clinical judg-
ment is that these neurophysiological facts cannot be
reversed…a once-living patient has now died’’ (p. 64). The
Council’s ﬁnal conclusion is that based on this new ratio-
nale the current neurological standard for declaring death is
still defensible. However, some Council members have
expressed dissent (personal statements published in the
white paper pp. 95–100 and pp. 107–119) on the proposed
philosophical rationale equating total brain failure (brain
death) with human death. In a separate commentary,
Shewmon challenges the validity of the critical role of
spontaneous breathing in deﬁning living organisms
(Shewmon 2009). The inner drive to breathe is absent not
only in total-brain failure patients, but also in conscious
patients with lower brain stem lesions and during sleep in
patients with Ondine’s curse. Therefore, brain death as a
state of impaired consciousness and apnea continues to be
challenged as a valid concept of human death because of
continued insufﬁcient scientiﬁc evidence and a less than
convincing philosophical rationale. Instead, as critics have
postulated, the moment when a living organism is dead,
and hence no longer alive is, conceptually, the moment
when there is an irreversible cessation of integrative unity
of the whole living organism (Byrne and Weaver 2004;
Joffe 2007a; Maruya et al. 2008).
Deﬁning death by neurological criteria has additional
conceptual implications. The reduction of any deﬁnition of
death to exclusively neurological terms ignores the
anthropologic, cultural, and religious dimensions that many
people value highly. The Committee on Increasing Rates of
Organ Donation recognizes the role that cultural and reli-
gious beliefs play in consenting to organ donation (Com-
mittee on Increasing Rates of Organ Donation-Board on
Health Sciences Policy-Institute of Medicine 2006). Cul-
tural and religious traditions and beliefs about the treatment
of the dead body, beliefs about life after death, and fears of
mutilation can also inﬂuence decisions about organ dona-
tion (p. 35). Policies and practices for procurement of
organs must be compatible with conditions deeply rooted
in cultural, religious, and legal traditions (p. 4). These
traditions, however, greatly vary among global
Fig. 2 Human death is a single
phenomenon. Human death is a
single phenomenon occurring
gradually as a process over
time. There is a gradual loss of
capacity for somatic integration
of the whole body because of an
irreversible cessation of all vital
and biological functions
including circulation,
respiration (controlled by the
brain stem), and consciousness.
The irreversibility of cessation
of circulatory and respiratory
functions is inter-linked to the
onset of whole brain necrosis.
Arbitrary neurological criteria
and circulatory criterion
redeﬁning human death in states
of impaired consciousness
enable heart-beating and non-
heart-beating procurement of
transplantable organs,
respectively
412 J. L. Verheijde et al.
123communities and pluralistic societies. Reduction of the
deﬁnition of death to brain-based criteria ignores that the
concept of death is not simply bioethical or biomedical in
nature but fundamentally shaped and driven by a series of
important sociologic inﬂuences (Kellehear 2008). Even if
there is medical consensus on brain-based criteria and
determination of brain death, this consensus is insufﬁcient
to conclude that ‘‘brain death’’ is in fact death (Joffe
2007b). To the contrary, for many health care professionals
and the general public, the concept of brain death is
becoming increasingly abstract and socially disconnected
from the nature of death (Kellehear 2008). This paradoxical
death, a brain-based determination of death with the
physical image of a normally functioning body, creates
emotional and cognitive conﬂicts for many health care
professionals and family members (Long et al. 2008).
At the November 9, 2007, meeting of the President’s
Council on Bioethics, Shewmon (The President’s Council
on Bioethics 2007b) pointed to the growing consensus that
the neurological standard for determining death has
become insufﬁcient to appropriately and comprehensively
explain brain death:
What has actually happened in the history of this
topic is [that] in 1968 we start with the practice. Then
there is a revision of statutory laws. Then there is an
attempt to come up with diagnostic standards. Then
there is a scramble to ﬁnd rationales for the statutory
laws, and there is incoherence and lack of consensus
about why destruction or total brain failure, whatever
you want to call it, should be death. And so the actual
history of brain death has followed exactly the
opposite sequence of events that ought to characterize
an ideal major socio-legal medical change. So I think
at this point in time it’s going to be very hard to
change how transplantation is done because it’s
already so ingrained. (The President’s Council on
Bioethics 2007b)
Accuracy of determining the state of ‘‘brain death’’
The concept of brain death has been deﬁned as an irre-
versible state of impaired consciousness diagnosed by
universally approved criteria. However, reaching consensus
on the ‘‘moment of death’’ can be time consuming. Propo-
nents also point out, what makes the determination of death
accurate is the accuracy of following the rules: the practice
guidelines that professional associations established for
determining brain death (Ivan and with contributions by
Melrose 2007). In 1995, The American Academy of Neu-
rology published clinical guidelines for the clinical deter-
mination of brain death. These clinical guidelines include:
(1) demonstration of coma; (2) evidence of the cause of
coma; (3) absence of confounding factors, including
hypothermia, the presence of drugs, or electrolyte or
endocrine disturbances; (4) absence of brain stem reﬂexes;
(5) absent motor responses; (6) apnea; (7) a repeat evalua-
tion in 6–72 h, with the time based on the patient’s age; and
(8) conﬁrmatory tests only when speciﬁc components of the
clinical testing cannot be reliably evaluated (The Quality
Standards Subcommittee of the American Academy of
Neurology 1995). However, over the past decade, critics
have increasingly scrutinized the scientiﬁc validity of these
clinical guidelines for demonstrating that all brain functions
have ceased irreversibly (Joffe 2007b, 2009; Karakatsanis
2008; Karakatsanis and Tsanakas 2002; Shewmon 1997).
The clinical guidelines established for brain death
determination and accepted as the medical standard (The
Quality Standards Subcommittee of the American Acad-
emy of Neurology 1995; Wijdicks 2001) ought to conﬁrm
the irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain,
including the brain stem, before organ donation (Presi-
dent’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research 1981);
they do not do so. The ‘accepted medical standard’ must
determine with clinical certainty that the brain injury has
reached the endpoint of a process of self-perpetuating
destruction of neural tissue (The President’s Council on
Bioethics 2008, p. 38). Clinical and histopathologic
observations support that there are serious ﬂaws in the
clinical criteria used to declare brain death for heart-beat-
ing organ donation. Several critical brain structures remain
viable and continue integrated neurological functioning
after clinically determined brain death. These include,
among others, electroencephalogram activity, brain stem
auditory and/or somatosensory evoked potentials and
hypothalamic functions (Joffe 2009). First, clinical obser-
vations suggest that heart-beating organ donors have
residual brain functions, including hormonal and neural
responses to nociception and pain during the procurement
process (Joffe 2007b). Surgical procurement, which is
performed on donors without general anesthesia (Keep
2000), induces hemodynamic responses in donors that are
similar to the responses of living organisms in distress
(Young and Matta 2000). Second, histopathologic obser-
vations in one study suggest that, even when the clinical
guidelines of brain death determination are applied
appropriately, more than 60% of heart-beating donors have
no or minimal structural disruption of the brain stem at
autopsy (Wijdicks and Pfeifer 2008); the absence of neu-
ropathologic features of ischemia or necrosis can also
suggest reversibility of ceased brain stem functions. In this
particular study, most of these donors were young patients
who were declared brain dead by clinical examination and
within 24 h of blunt-force traumatic brain injury (Wijdicks
and Pfeifer 2008).
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irreversible loss of all brain functions is problematic for the
following reasons: (1) the short interval between the initial
acute brain injury and clinical declaration of death cannot
exclude reversible neurological ﬁndings that are masquer-
ading as brain death; (2) no conﬁrmatory test is mandated
to validate the complete absence of perfusion pressure and
cessation of blood ﬂow to the whole brain; and (3) brain
stem ischemic changes, which are structural surrogates of
irreversibility, are not always present on autopsy (Presi-
dent’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research 1981).
The likelihood of incorrect declaration of brain death
increases when the timeline necessary for determining
irreversible cessation of critical brain functions is short-
ened because of early organ procurement. Transplant
advocates have recommended against performing conﬁr-
matory tests when declaring brain death in order to avoid a
delay or deferral of organ donation (Greer et al. 2008b).
Not performing conﬁrmatory tests may also lead to cata-
strophic errors in the clinical determination of brain death.
The absence of neuropathologic ﬁndings of profound brain
stem ischemia can suggest reversible causes of coma or
perhaps retained neurological activity undetected by clin-
ical examination (Walker 1978). In a Canadian survey,
46% of neurosurgeons considered the absence of moderate
structural damage in both the brain stem and cerebral
cortex on brain autopsy to be incompatible with a clinical
determination of brain death (Joffe et al. 2007). More than
one-third of the neurosurgeons surveyed also considered
that some blood ﬂow to the brain or a brain stem with
minimal microscopic damage is incompatible with a clin-
ical determination of brain death. Accepting questionable
clinical guidelines as the medical standard for early dec-
laration of brain death and organ donation can have fatal
consequences when patients whose condition may be sal-
vageable, i.e., amenable to treatment, are determined to be
brain dead (Lifesitenews.com 2008; Morales 2008; The
President’s Council on Bioethics 2008).
It is commonly claimed that, despite unresolved and
debated issues about clinical determination of brain death,
both the concept and the practice of declaring brain death
for organ donation and transplantation have gained wide
acceptance in most parts of the world. The development of
and adherence to practice guidelines to determine brain
death are believed to have elicited universal compliance
(Ivan and with contributions by Melrose 2007). Recently,
the inconsistency of the medical standard for the clinical
determination of brain death for organ donation has been
highlighted at leading US neurological hospitals (Laureys
and Fins 2008). This inconsistency has opened the door not
only for loosening the accepted medical standard for the
determination of brain death, but also for potentially
sacriﬁcing neurologically salvageable individuals for the
sole purpose of organ procurement. In a study by Mathur
et al. (2008), organs were procured from 142 pediatric
patients who were heart-beating donors, based on brain-
death declaration, between January 2000 and December
2004 in southern California. The authors reported their
study ﬁndings, which had been based on the medicolegal
standard: ‘‘If it’s not documented, it wasn’t done.’’ One of
294 neurological examinations documented completion of
all the elements required in clinical brain-death examina-
tion, 26% had the apnea test correctly performed, 15% had
at least two examinations performed at the recommended
time intervals, and 58% had cerebral angiography as a
conﬁrmatory test. Therefore, in this study, a signiﬁcant
proportion of donors may have been incorrectly declared as
brain dead. Similar observations have been noted among
adult donors as well; more than two-thirds of leading US
neurological hospitals vary widely in their compliance with
clinical guidelines for determining brain death before organ
donation (Greer et al. 2008a).
Other states of impaired consciousness as sources
of transplantable organs
Circulatory criterion of death
With the growing need for transplantable organs far
exceeding the number of organs procured from brain-dead
donors, an alternative criterion to declare death based on
cessation of circulation was incorporated in the Pittsburgh
NHBOD protocol (DeVita and Snyder 1993). The circu-
latory criterion to declare death can be used for procuring
transplantable organs from patients with other clinical
states of impaired consciousness but who cannot be
declared clinically brain dead (Fig. 1). Immediately after
the introduction of the NHBOD protocol, the criterion of
2 min of circulatory arrest for declaring cardiorespiratory
death and commencing organ procurement became con-
troversial (Lynn 1993). Circulatory arrest is determined by
the loss of arterial pulse. The Institute of Medicine pub-
lished a report on the practice and protocols of NHBOD in
the United States (Committee on Non-Heart-Beating
Transplantation II-The Scientiﬁc, Ethical Basis for Practice
and Protocols-Division of Health Care Services-Institute of
Medicine 2000). Over 90% of NHBOD protocols in the
United States allow for organs to be procured at 5 min or
shorter time periods following circulatory arrest (Howard
M. Nathan-Medscape Transplantation 2005). Recently,
Denver Children’s Hospital amended the NHBOD protocol
to allow surgical procurement of hearts for transplantation
after 75 s of circulatory arrest (Boucek et al. 2008).
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validity of the circulatory criterion is questionable (Joffe
2007a) but also that brain-based criteria of death contribute
little, if anything, to deﬁning the exact moment of death in
NHBOD (Shemie 2007). In human beings, a coronary
perfusion pressure of 15 mmHg is sufﬁcient for continued
viability of the heart muscle and return of spontaneous
circulation after initial circulatory arrest (Paradis et al.
1990). Coronary perfusion pressure is the gradient between
asystolic (diastolic) arterial and central venous pressure
subtracted from the intrapericardial pressure. Autoresusci-
tation i.e. spontaneous return of circulation and recovery of
heart and brain functions (also called the Lazarus phe-
nomenon) has been reported after 10 min of circulatory
arrest in human beings (Adhiyaman et al. 2007; Joffe
2007a). The presence of coronary and cerebral perfusion
pressures after circulatory arrest can explain the Lazarus
phenomenon and autoresuscitation in some of the reported
cases. This observation is relevant not only because coro-
nary and cerebral perfusion pressures are related to sys-
temic blood ﬂow, but it is also independently controlled by
selective arterial and venous vasomotor tones (vascular
smooth muscles contraction) and intrapericardial and
intracranial pressures surrounding the heart and brain,
respectively (Rady et al. 2007). In spite of this physiologic
phenomenon, the Institute of Medicine has relied on the
loss of systemic arterial pulse and circulation for 2–5 min
as the exclusive circulatory criterion for determining death
in NHBOD and with no requirement for the complete
absence of coronary and cerebral perfusion pressures
(Committee on Increasing Rates of Organ Donation-Board
on Health Sciences Policy-Institute of Medicine 2006).
Neuropathologic features of ischemia or necrosis of the
whole brain (and brain stem) become integral observations
to establish, with clinical certainty, irreversible apnea and
unconsciousness when determining death by the circulatory
criterion in NHBOD. The President’s Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and
Behavioral Research has recommended that circulatory
arrest time should be longer than 15 min for the onset of
brain ischemia and to the point that irreversible cessation of
brain functions (including respiratory function of the brain
stem) is certain (President’s Commission for the Study of
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and
Behavioral Research 1981). The criterion of a circulatory
arrest time between 75 s and 5 min is unlikely to result in
irreversible cessation of all integrated neurological func-
tions and respiratory drive in NHBOD. Extracorporeal
circulation and cardiopulmonary bypass initiated in
NHBOD after 5 min of circulatory arrest invariably rean-
imate donors during surgical procurement of organs (De-
john and Zwischenberger 2006). From a legal perspective
on determining death with cardiorespiratory criteria, the
irreversibility of cessation of circulatory function is inter-
linked with the irreversibility of cessation of respiratory
function (of the brain stem) (National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 1981). This point
must be emphasized because the UDDA considers human
death as a single phenomenon whether determined by
neurological criteria or by cardiorespiratory criteria.
Considering death to be the total cessation of life pro-
cesses characteristic of living organisms throws the prac-
tice of applying either circulatory or neurological criteria
for declaring death for organ donation into question
(Fig. 2). The exact moment when loss of circulation and
loss of somatic integration occur is not known and, there-
fore, the concept of brain death adds little, if any, relevant
information about how to determine the precise moment of
death in human beings.
Accuracy of determining other states of impaired
consciousness
Other states of impaired consciousness, besides brain
death, include coma, akinetic mutism (locked-in syn-
drome), minimally conscious state, and vegetative state.
Since 1997, pressure has been growing to expand the
recovery of transplantable organs from patients with other
states of impaired consciousness, such as those in a vege-
tative state (Hoffenberg et al. 1997). In September 2007,
The President’s Council on Bioethics discussed the Draft
White Paper on neurological determination of death and
renewed the interest in organ procurement from vegetative
state to meet an increasing demand for transplantable
organs (The President’s Council on Bioethics 2007a). The
renaming of the neurological standard for determining
human death from ‘‘brain death’’ to ‘‘total brain failure’’
preempted the Council’s discussion expanding the recovery
of transplantable organs from other states of impaired
consciousness. In August 2008, a perspective roundtable
discussion of organ procurement for transplantation echoed
similar interest to abandon traditional neurological criteria
for determining death (The New England Journal of
Medicine (online) 2008; Truog and Miller 2008).
As highlighted in previous sections of this paper, several
shortfalls exist regarding the scientiﬁc validity of the
concept of brain death. The unassailability of the clinical
guidelines for the determination of not only brain death but
also that of vegetative state has also been called into
question. The American Academy of Neurology has
described vegetative state with the following criteria: (1)
no evidence of awareness of self or environment and an
inability to interact with others; (2) no evidence of sus-
tained, reproducible, purposeful, or voluntary behavioral
responses to visual, auditory, tactile, or noxious stimuli; (3)
no evidence of language comprehension or expression; (4)
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sleep-wake cycles; (5) sufﬁciently preserved hypothalamic
and brain stem autonomic functions to permit survival with
medical and nursing care; (6) bowel and bladder inconti-
nence; and (7) variably preserved cranial nerves (pupillary,
oculocephalic, corneal, vestibulo-ocular, gag) and spinal
reﬂexes (Report of the Quality Standards Subcommittee of
the American Academy of Neurology 1995). The term
persistent vegetative state (PVS) is applied when the
clinical criteria of vegetative state persist for at least
1 month after the patient has suffered impaired con-
sciousness. The term permanent vegetative state is applied
when the clinical criteria of vegetative state persist at least
3 months after nontraumatic brain injury and 12 months
after traumatic brain injury in adults and children. Both
brain death and PVS are possible outcomes of the comatose
state, but, in PVS, the brain stem, which sustains functions
such as respiration and circulation, has been spared injury.
The American Medical Association has posited that med-
ical treatment, such as artiﬁcial nutrition and hydration,
may be withdrawn in patients who are in a PVS (Council
on Scientiﬁc Affairs, Council on Ethical, Judicial Affairs of
the American Medical Association 1990). Because these
patients may be allowed to die, they may be considered for
organ donation; however, unless physician-assisted death is
legalized, patients in PVS are ineligible to become organ
donors (Detry et al. 2008). Although some have advocated
the acceptance of the concept of higher brain death so that
organs from patients in permanent vegetative state can be
used for transplantation (Hoffenberg et al. 1997), this
concept of death has not been endorsed, accepted, or
legalized in the United States.
It is often postulated that patients in PVS are devoid of
conscious content and cognitive and affective functions
and that they have no behavioral evidence of awareness of
their external environment (Ivan and with contributions by
Melrose 2007). A neurophysiologic explanation of
impaired consciousness in PVS underpins this premise,
although scientiﬁc observations and theory may not be
capable of providing a complete account of consciousness
(Zeman 2001). Critics have countered, however, that the
evidence from human brain imaging studies as well as
neurological damage in animals and humans suggests that
some form of consciousness can survive the brain damage
that commonly causes vegetative state (Panksepp et al.
2007). Neuroscientiﬁc evidence indicates that raw emo-
tional or affective feelings (primary-process affects) can
exist without cognitive awareness of those feelings. The
fact that patients in a PVS can have the capacity to expe-
rience affective feelings in the absence of any reﬂective
awareness represents a diametrically opposite position to
the one claiming that these patients are devoid of conscious
content and cognitive and affective functions. Many
aspects of human cognition can go on in the absence of
reﬂective awareness. Functional neuroimaging methods
have demonstrated that aspects of speech perception,
emotional processing, language comprehension, and even
conscious awareness might be retained in some patients
who behaviorally meet all of the criteria that deﬁne PVS
(Owen and Coleman 2008). The diagnosis of PVS is made
primarily based on clinical judgment and without per-
forming static and functional neuroimaging and electrodi-
agnostic studies to conﬁrm this diagnosis with certainty
(Wijdicks and Cranford 2005). When diagnosing vegeta-
tive state, clinicians may not be as meticulous in their
thought processes as they should be, particularly because
the need for transplantable organs has risen to the level of
what has been called a national health crisis. The risk of
misdiagnosing another reversible condition as vegetative
state is greater because the vegetative state is not as
common as are other prolonged states of impaired con-
sciousness. Shewmon has cautioned that the very use of the
term vegetative state itself predisposes physicians to sloppy
thinking and employing logical fallacies by implying that
something is ‘by deﬁnition’ what is actually an intrinsically
unveriﬁable hypothesis (Shewmon 2004). The clinical
criteria for the diagnosis of vegetative state cannot be
proven to be valid beyond doubt. The clinical criteria for the
diagnosis of vegetative state are a challenge to the premise
that good medical research involves, among other aspects,
‘‘hypotheses susceptible of proof and disproof, and a
methodology that systematically rules out all other expla-
nations’’ (Shewmon 2004). The accurate determination of
PVS requires, among other criteria, clear and robust stan-
dards that can be followed in a consistent fashion by the
medical community (Rifkinson-Mann 2003). Currently,
there is neither consensus on the criteria that encompass the
spectrum of PVS nor agreement on the criteria that distin-
guish this diagnosis from other states of impaired con-
sciousness (Cusack et al. 2000). One retrospective study
lookedattheclinicalrecordsof40patientswhohadreceived
a diagnosis of being in a vegetative state; 17 patients (43%)
were found to be in other states of impaired consciousness,
i.e., had a misdiagnosis of being in a vegetative state
(Andrewsetal.1996).Alloftheseopen-endedquestionsand
uncertainties surrounding the diagnosis of PVS (The House
of Representatives of the 144th General Assembly of the
State of Delaware 2008), as with brain-dead, indeed make it
medically, ethically, and legally impossible to procure
organs by following heart-beating procurement procedures
in patients who are in a vegetative state. After a careful
analysis of various viewpoints, the President’s Council on
Bioethics has rejected the concept of higher brain or neo-
cortical failure alone (with normal brain stem functions) for
determining human death and procuring transplantable
organs (The President’s Council on Bioethics 2008).
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123The scientiﬁc validity and accuracy of clinical guide-
lines declaring other states of impaired consciousness as
unrecoverable within a few days after non-traumatic brain
injury have also been called into question. The American
Academy of Neurology formulated practice parameters for
predicting unrecoverable coma within 3 days of acute brain
injury after successful cardiopulmonary resuscitation (Wi-
jdicks et al. 2006). The practice parameters were derived
from retrospective analysis of published studies over a time
period of 40 years. The predictive accuracy of the Amer-
ican Academy of Neurology practice parameters have not
been prospectively validated in either multicenter or mul-
tinational studies. Nevertheless, the practice parameters
and clinical guidelines declaring states of impaired con-
sciousness or coma unrecoverable within days have
become essential prerequisites to facilitate early recovery
of transplantable organs (Fig. 1).
Religion and physician-assisted death in organ
procurement
It is commonly stated that all religions approve of organ
donation (Ivan and with contributions by Melrose 2007;
Woien et al. 2006); however, some states in the United
States allow religious beliefs to take precedence over the
concept of brain death (Capron 2001). Indeed, in response
to the objection of some Orthodox Jews to the use of
neurological criteria in diagnosing death, a 1987 New York
regulation requires hospitals to have procedures for the
‘‘reasonable accommodation’’ of patients’ religious or
moral objections to the standards used to determine death
(New York State Department of Health 2005). In 1991,
New Jersey enacted a statute that has separate sections
recognizing ‘‘traditional cardio-respiratory criteria’’ and
‘‘modern neurological criteria,’’ and that prohibits the
physician from using the latter when he or she ‘‘has reason
to believe’’ that ‘‘a declaration [on the basis of neurological
criteria] would violate the personal religious beliefs of the
individual (New Jersey Ofﬁce of the Attorney General
2007).’’ It is interesting to note that most of the discussion
of organ donation stems from the focus on brain death or
heart-beating donation. It is commonly assumed, without
further formal discussion among religious leaders, that the
justiﬁcation of the more recent protocols of organ pro-
curement in NHBOD, including in other states of impaired
consciousness, can be derived from the agreement, on
principle, that organ donation is a genuine act of beneﬁ-
cence. However, recent events and developments in organ
procurement procedures have triggered a response from
religious institutions. Scholars from diverse religious
afﬁliations have revisited the opinions on brain death in
light of contemporary medical knowledge (Brown 2007;
Diamond 2007; Kunin 2004; Shea 2007). The House of
Lords European Union Committee published the 17th
Report of Session 2007–2008 on Increasing the Supply of
Donor Organs within the European Union (House of Lords
European Union Committee 2008). The report recognizes
that several major religious groups (as well as some indi-
viduals with no faith group afﬁliation) had major reserva-
tions about the concept of brain death and opposed organ
donation from donors whose death has been deﬁned solely
on the basis of brain death. Several diverse religious groups
oppose organ donation because of a fundamental belief that
the human body is a trust that has been given and owned by
God and, therefore, should not be physically violated by
removing organs. Although Pope Pius XII declared that
rigorously applying the criteria for ascertaining brain death
sufﬁces for arriving with moral certitude at the conclusion
that death has occurred, Pope Benedict XVI has asked that
the debate on brain death and organ procurement be
revived (Shea 2007; Timesonline 2008). Pope Benedict
XVI stated that vital organs can be extracted ‘‘ex cadavere’’
[from a dead body], if and only if, the donor’s true death
can be certiﬁed beyond a doubt (Pope Benedict XVI 2008).
If the medical assumption of the moral certitude of brain
death criteria turns out to be wrong, then we would no
longer be able to use brain-death criteria with moral cer-
tainty (Brown 2007). In addition, it must be noted that, in
1957, a group of anesthesiologists posed the ethical prob-
lem of medical prolongation for life to Pope Pius XII and
asked for instruction (Giacomini 1997). In 1958, Pope Pius
XII referred the dilemma back to the doctors, afﬁrming that
the criteria for timing (not deﬁning) death under artiﬁcial
life support should be left to the attending physician. It is
important to point out that, at that time, neither the press
nor physicians interpreted the Pope’s statement as a call to
redeﬁne death itself (Giacomini 1997). It is also widely
recognized that the degree of certitude required in deter-
mining death is inﬂuenced by the anticipated removal of
organs for transplantation (Diamond 2007). Shewmon
argued that the medical community has fallen into the
logical fallacy of accepting that the absence of evidence of
conscious activity constitutes evidence of its absence
(Shewmon 1997). Diamond concluded that the debate
about brain death should be elevated to a truly scientiﬁc
dialog about the signiﬁcance of certain irreversible losses
of function (Diamond 2007). It is therefore premature to
conclude that no religious opposition exists to organ pro-
curement procedures. We speculate that religious leaders
will reopen the discussion on these issues in the near future.
Studies have shown that patients consider the most
important end-of-life decision to be their wish to not be
kept alive on life support when there is little hope for a
meaningful recovery (Ivan and with contributions by
Melrose 2007). If the clinical guidelines used in medical
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123practice and accepted as medical standards for the deter-
mination of either brain death or other states of impaired
consciousness cannot exclude catastrophic diagnostic
errors or uncertainty about human death, then heart-beating
organ donation and NHBOD are effectively physician-
assisted death. We agree with Truog’s analysis that for-
mulation of the Harvard criteria for brain death and organ
donation in 1968 marked the beginning of medical exper-
imentation with physician-assisted death in the United
States (Truog 2008). A concept of brain death may meet
the criteria of a necessary condition for death but fails as a
sufﬁcient condition for a comprehensive understanding of
death. The President’s Council on Bioethics recognizes and
acknowledges that there is no clinical or scientiﬁc evidence
proving that death based on only neurological criteria thus
indeed fully encompasses the concept of human death (The
President’s Council on Bioethics 2008, pp. 54–57). The
Council reappraises the reality that the neurological stan-
dard of ‘‘whole brain death’’ corresponds to a ‘‘condition
of profound incapacity, diagnostically distinct from all
other cases of severe injury’’ (p. 38). Although the Council
does not state it in so many words, it implies that over the
past 40 years, all statutory death laws, all diagnostic cri-
teria for ‘‘brain death,’’ and all transplantations from heart-
beating donors have, in retrospect, been based on an invalid
conceptual framework and incorrect empirical facts. The
validity of the Council’s new philosophical rationale for
continued justiﬁcation of the concept of brain death has
already been questioned (Shewmon 2009). Because of this,
signiﬁcant changes would be required in how we think
about death and dying, how we provide and withdraw
medical care from brain-dead patients and those in other
states of impaired consciousness, and how we make deci-
sions about the ethical permissibility of NHBOD. We have
also previously argued that applying circulatory criterion
for determining irreversible cessation of circulation and
respiration (of the brain stem) in compliance with the
UDDA, is not compatible with recovering transplantable
organs in NHBOD (Verheijde et al. 2007a).
What are the practical implications for bedside clini-
cians? From medical and ethical perspectives, surgically
procuringorganswithoutgeneralanesthesia,whilefailingto
recognize that donors may not be really dead, can inﬂict
unnecessary harm at the end of life. Harm includes the
possibility of active inner awareness as well as the experi-
ence of pain and other primary-process affects in incipiently
dying donors during surgical procurement (Giacino 1997).
Death by organ procurement may also violate deeply rooted
personal end-of-life values and beliefs of some donors.
Procuring organs based on unsubstantiated criteria of death
also raises legal questions about the compliance with
homicide statutes (McGregor et al. 2008). Consenting to
organ donation after death cannot be construed as
consenting for physician-assisted death in order to procure
transplantable organs. Donors or surrogates cannot consent
to their own death unless such actions have already been
legalized in society. For these reasons and in order to con-
tinue the current practice of organ procurement, we posited
that recovery of transplantable organs from decedents
requires a paradigm change in the ethics of organ donation
(Verheijde et al. 2007a). Within the revised paradigm, the
uncertainties about clinical determination of states of
impaired consciousness and death in human beings, which
also include brain death, are disclosed and discussed publi-
cally to maintain trust in the integrity of the medical pro-
fession. Furthermore, if the general public and society judge
that the current degree of clinical uncertainty is acceptable,
then establishing a legal deﬁnition of end-of-life care that
would include physician-assisted death can be an option to
resolve the existing conﬂicts in procuring transplantable
organs from patients who have little hope for a meaningful
recovery and who may be in states of impaired conscious-
ness (Ivan and with contributions by Melrose 2007).
Conclusions
Brain death and vegetative state are two clinical conditions
within a spectrum of pathologic states of impaired con-
sciousness. The clinical accuracy of diagnosis and dis-
crimination among different pathologic states of impaired
consciousness remain open to scientiﬁc questioning and
debate. The neurological standard to determine brain death
fails to provide conclusive evidence that the brain-based
criteriafulﬁlltheconceptofdeathbecausethisstatedoesnot
disrupt somatic integrative unity or coordinated biological
functioningofalivingorganism.Thedeterminationofdeath
in heart-beating donors by relying on brain-based criteria
excludes relevant anthropologic, psychosocial, cultural, and
religious aspects of death and dying. Current clinical
guidelines for determining brain death do not require the
conﬁrmatory presence of structural disruption and ischemic
injury of the brain stem on autopsy; therefore, the guidelines
do not completely exclude reversible loss of integrated
neurological functions. Wide practice variation and lack of
compliance with the clinical guidelines for determining
brain death before organ donation are generating concerns
for potential misdiagnosis and incorrect declaration of brain
death. The lack of compliance, scientiﬁc robustness, and
discriminatory power of the clinical guidelines, which are
accepted as a medical standard, increase the risk of physi-
cians erring by determining reversible states of impaired
consciousness as an irreversible state of brain death.
Brain-based criteria of death fail in determining the
precise moment of an organism’s death when death is
declared in NHBOD protocols by circulatory criterion in
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123patients with states of impaired consciousness and who
cannot be declared clinically brain-dead. From a medical
practice point of view, the deﬁnition of brain death con-
ﬁrms that the practice of NHBOD can only be justiﬁed if
circulatory arrest is observed for longer than 15 min to
allow for the onset of whole brain (including brain stem)
ischemia and demonstrating irreversible cessation of inte-
grated neurological functions and respiratory drive. It is
unlikely that a waiting time of 75 s to 5 min is an appro-
priate amount of time for the whole brain to irreversibly
cease functioning. As a result, the term brain death cannot
be applied to validate and justify current practices in
NHBOD in most medical institutions in the United States
and elsewhere. Neuroimaging and electrophysiology stud-
ies of the vegetative state call into question the validity of
clinical determination of this state of impaired conscious-
ness. The scientiﬁc uncertainty of the deﬁnition and clini-
cal imprecision of the determination of states of impaired
consciousness (including brain death) have not been dis-
closed to the general public nor have they been broadly
debated by the medical community or religious scholars.
Heart-beating or non-heart-beating organ procurement
from patients with impaired consciousness is in reality a
concealed practice of physician-assisted death, and there-
fore violates both the criminal laws and central tenet of
medicine of do-no-harm principle. Society must decide if
physician-assisted death is permissible and desirable to
resolve the conﬂict about procuring organs from patients
with impaired consciousness and the perceived need to
enhance the supply of transplantable organs.
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